Titlebook: Voting Procedures Under a Restricted Domain; An Examination of th Dan S. Felsenthal,Hannu Nurmi Book 2019 The Editor(s) (if applicable) and

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Introduction,ncountered in practice are of such nature that the paradoxes are very unlikely or downright impossible. Ever since the publication of Arrow’s theorem, the role of domain restrictions has been appreciated. However, the earlier studies have mainly focused on conditions for rational collective choices

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The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to Lack of Monotonicity in a Restricted Domain, that are characterized by the presence and election of a Condorcet winner. Moulin’s (Journal of Economic Theory 45:53–64, .) theorem establishes the incompatibility of Condorcet-consistency and invulnerability to the No-Show paradox in voting procedures when there are more than three alternatives t

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The (In)Vulnerability of 20 Voting Procedures to the No-Show Paradox in a Restricted Domain,s (Journal of Economic Theory 45:53–64, .) result states that if one wants to exclude the possibility of the No-Show paradox, one has to resort to procedures that do not necessarily elect the Condorcet winner when one exists. This paper examines 10 Condorcet-consistent and 10 Condorcet-non-consisten

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