Titlebook: Standards-Battles in Open Source Software; The Case of Firefox Huibert Vries,Henk Vries,Ilan Oshri Book 2008 Palgrave Macmillan, a division

Adrenaline

What can be Learnt from these Browser Wars,s and the combination with proprietary software. The open standard can then also serve as the basis for a proprietary, competing standard, such as Netscape’s Mozilla derivative in the second browser war. The license thus makes it attractive for firms to participate in the standard’s development and promotion.

TAG

Introduction,in, 2007; Sebenius, 2002; Yoffie and Cusumano, 1999) have been dedicated to the Internet browser war between Microsoft Internet Explorer (IE) versus Netscape (Communicator) in the 1990s, leaving Microsoft’s IE as the standard web browser. In 2002, IE controlled an estimated 95% of the browser market

Expertise

Standards and Standards-Setting,standards: (1) minimum attributes that cover basic product requirements and minimum quality, for example, ISO 9000 standards or safety standards; (2) interface requirements that enable interoperability when products are connected, for example, the HTTP standard that enables web browsers to communica

鋼盔

Celiac-Plexus

Standard-Setting Mechanisms in Open Source Software,ng a product with superior quality given its price. However, IE’s quality was inferior. Yet IE managed to become the winner in standards war I. Three factors affected IE’s position in Browser War I: (1) Microsoft’s bundling of IE with Windows; (2) Microsoft’s control of key distribution channels thr

GUMP

headway

Introduction,etscape (Communicator) in the 1990s, leaving Microsoft’s IE as the standard web browser. In 2002, IE controlled an estimated 95% of the browser market (Onestat. com, 2002.), a seemingly impregnable position.

DALLY

Standard-Setting Mechanisms in Open Source Software,factors affected IE’s position in Browser War I: (1) Microsoft’s bundling of IE with Windows; (2) Microsoft’s control of key distribution channels through exclusive agreements with ISPs and OEMs; (3) Microsoft’s creation and dispersal of proprietary extensions.

paradigm

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