Titlebook: Security Assessment in Vehicular Networks; Suguo Du,Haojin Zhu Book 2013 The Author(s) 2013 Game theory.Location privacy.Security and priv

Exaltation

書(shū)目名稱Security Assessment in Vehicular Networks影響因子(影響力)




書(shū)目名稱Security Assessment in Vehicular Networks影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名




書(shū)目名稱Security Assessment in Vehicular Networks網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度




書(shū)目名稱Security Assessment in Vehicular Networks網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開(kāi)度學(xué)科排名




書(shū)目名稱Security Assessment in Vehicular Networks被引頻次




書(shū)目名稱Security Assessment in Vehicular Networks被引頻次學(xué)科排名




書(shū)目名稱Security Assessment in Vehicular Networks年度引用




書(shū)目名稱Security Assessment in Vehicular Networks年度引用學(xué)科排名




書(shū)目名稱Security Assessment in Vehicular Networks讀者反饋




書(shū)目名稱Security Assessment in Vehicular Networks讀者反饋學(xué)科排名

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ARBOR

Suguo Du,Haojin Zhuwo groups. Interactive data are presented for a group of native cancer patients and a group of foreign patients. The study involved 50 cancer patients (25 Italians and 25 foreigners) who were interviewed through the narrative method on the issues of social support in the context of the disease. All

AXIS

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deficiency

plasma-cells

verschilt de communicatie met iemand met een andere etnische achtergrond – behalve mogelijk de taal – niet wezenlijk van die met iemand met dezelfde etnische achtergrond..Doorslaggevend in de communicatie zijn de inzet, respect en betrokkenheid bij de ander die zich vooral uiten in de lichaamstaal.

BILK

Security Assessment via Attack Tree Model,earch challenges, especially on the aspect of location privacy. The existing literatures focus on preventive techniques to achieve location privacy protection, however the location privacy risk assessment receives less attention. In this chapter, we introduce a novel risk assessment method to evalua

VAN

Attack-Defense Tree Based Security Assessment,ategies. We also introduce two concepts of Return on Attack and Return on Investment to represent the potential gain from launching an attack or adopting a countermeasure. Both the attack-defense tree and the introduced concepts are preparation work for the attack-defense game analysis of later work

Nebulous

A VANETs Attack-Defense Game,k and defense costs and gains, and thus cannot appropriately model the mutual interaction between the attacker and defender. In this study, we consider both of the rational attacker and defender who decide whether to launch an attack or adopt a countermeasure based on its adversary‘s strategy to max