Titlebook: Rational Choice and Social Welfare; Theory and Applicati Prasanta K. Pattanaik,Koichi Tadenuma,Naoki Yoshih Book 2008 Springer-Verlag Berli

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On Non-Welfarist Social Ordering Functionserences. For this methodology, the criticisms by Dworkin (1981a, 2000), Sen (1979, 1980), and others are well known. They criticized the limited scope of information used to evaluate social welfare in the aforementioned methodology. Moreover, they criticize the welfarist neutral attitude vis-à-vis t

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Monotonicity and Solidarity Axioms in Economics and Game Theoryrollary, they should be treated ‘similarly’ when a change occurs for which no one is responsible. A minimal condition of ‘similar’ treatment is certainly that nobody benefits from such a change if someone else suffers from it.

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Choice-Consistent Resolutions of the Efficiency-Equity Trade-Offnt criteria are efficiency and equity of allocations. . is probably the most widely accepted criterion among economists, but it is silent about the distributional equity of allocations. On the other hand, several concepts of equity have been proposed and extensively studied in welfare economics. Two

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On the Microtheoretic Foundations of Cagan’s Demand for Money Functionrgent and Wallace (1973)) and empirical, (see for instance, Aghevli and Khan (1977), Anderson, Bomberger, and Makinen (1988), Babcock and Makinen (1975), Cagan (1956), Christiano (1987), Easterly, Mauro, and Schmidt-Hebbel (1995), Engsted (1993), Metin and Maslu (1999), Michael, Nobay, and Peel (199