Titlebook: Nuclear India in the Twenty-First Century; D. R. SarDesai (Professor of Indian History),Raju Book 2002 D. R. SarDesai and Raju G. C. Thom

黃瓜

Whither Nuclear India?t of broader regional, global and domestic political compulsions, and from the standpoint of India’ long-term and cumulative historical experience. India’ nuclear threat perceptions were first focused on China during the second half of the 1960s following the Chinese atomic test in 1964. India’ main

labyrinth

What Makes The Indian Bomb Tick?four somewhat distinct phases, with the third culminating in the nuclear tests of May 1998. The chapter then chronicles unusually dramatic events of the fourth phase, beginning in 1999—the Lahore summit; the Kargil War; the draft nuclear doctrine. The chapter suggests that these events indicated som

注意

clarify

India, the International System, and Nuclear Weaponsat India has with China and Pakistan, domestic politics, or the predispositions of individual decision makers. This chapter argues that although domestic factors may be associated with the timing of the 1998 tests, the overarching cause of India’ nuclear behavior needs to be located in systemic fact

enormous

鋼盔

Foreknowledge

The International Dynamics of a Nuclear Indiarrence between India and its neighbors, China and Pakistan, and whether the 1998 nuclear tests make deterrence any more robust is questionable. Like the general concept of nuclear deterrence, India’ declared policy of minimum deterrence remains a chimera. However, UN Security Council Resolution 1172

刀鋒

India’ Nuclear Technology Policy: Capabilities and the Aftermath of Testingure and .deliver nuclear weapons. The question is posed as to whether going nuclear has India safer as a result or whether it has merely added to the instability in the region. Perhaps the history of foreign aggression against India over the ages and the partiality of the United States to China are

有常識

Ballistic Missiles: Complicating the Nuclear Quagmireially devastating results for the Indo-subcontinent’s stability. The introduction of nuclear capable ballistic missiles on a significant scale adds to the negative variables that collectively raises the risk of an inadvertent nuclear war breaking out in a region that is unstable principally due to t

Sciatica

Nuclear Weapons and The Indian Armed Forces 11 and 13, 1998. The subsequent Indian doctrine of minimum credible deterrence, too, was based on few inputs from the end-users—the Indian armed forces. At present the Indian Air Force has the most developed infrastructure, equipment, and trained forces to provide a limited deterrent. However, the