Titlebook: Networks and Groups; Models of Strategic Bhaskar Dutta,Matthew O. Jackson Book 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003 Coalitions.Desi

過(guò)渡時(shí)期

Competition for Goods in Buyer-Seller Networks,t different agents’ bargaining power. Even distant links may have large effects on agents’ earnings. These payoff results, and the identification of the paths themselves, should prove useful to further analysis of network structure.

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,Buyers’ and Sellers’ Cartels on Markets With Indivisible Goods,s, and the cartels formed are smaller than under unilateral collusion. Both the buyers’ and sellers’ cartels choose to exclude only one trader from the market. This result suggests that there are limits to bilateral collusion, and that the threat of collusion on one side of the market does not lead to increased collusion on the other side.

homeostasis

Hay-Fever

2510-3970 onomic Design on the formation of networks and groups, we were happy to accept because of the growing research on this important topic. We were also pleasantly surprised at the response to our request for submissions to the special issue, receiving a much larger number of sub- missions than we had a

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Bhaskar Dutta,Matthew O. JacksonIncludes supplementary material:

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坦白

Graphs and Cooperation in Games,re, are studied for games in characteristic function form. Fair allocation rules are defined, and these are proven to be unique, closely related to the Shapley value, and stable for a wide class of games.