Titlebook: Network Games, Control, and Optimization; Proceedings of NETGC Jean Walrand,Quanyan Zhu,Tania Jimenez Conference proceedings 2019 Springer

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小淡水魚(yú)

On the Asymptotic Content Routing Stretch in Network of Caches: Impact of Popularity Learning,n our study is the need of learning content popularity in an online manner to consider time-varying changes of content popularity, where there exists a complex inter-play among (a) how long we should learn popularity, (b) how often we should change cached contents, and (c) how we use learnt populari

reptile

Tiered Spectrum Measurement Markets for Licensed Secondary Spectrum,ccupancy so as to enable commercial use of this spectrum when incumbent users are not present. Motivated by this, we consider a scenario in which two spectrum access (SA) firms seek to access a spectrum band for secondary access and must in turn purchase spectrum measurements from one of the two ESC

Apraxia

Licentious

Impact of Social Connectivity on Herding Behavior,their private observation about the value of the product and actions of their predecessors. Bikhchandani et. al (1992) and Banerjee (1992) introduced such a model and showed that after a finite time, almost surely, users discard their private information and herd on an action asymptotically. In this

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dilute

Routing Game with Nonseparable Costs for EV Driving and Charging Incentive Design,parts of society, at the transport level through congestion/pollution and at the energy level. In this paper, we consider the design of driving and charging optimal incentive through a routing game approach with multiple types of vehicles: gasoline and electric. We show that the game is not standard

outset

The Social Medium Selection Game,selection of a social network (e.g., Twitter versus Facebook or Linkedin) or of a group within a given social network. The utility for a player to send its content to some medium is given as the difference between the dissemination utility at this medium and some transmission cost. We model this gam

MAZE

Public Good Provision Games on Networks with Resource Pooling,r exerts a certain level of effort to improve his own utility. At the same time, the agents are interdependent and the utility of each agent depends not only on his own effort but also on the other agents’ effort level. As the agents have a limited budget and can exert limited effort, question arise

Harpoon