Titlebook: Hume and the Problem of Miracles: A Solution; Michael P. Levine Book 1989 Kluwer Academic Publishers 1989 David Hume.epistemology.experien

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What is Involved in Knowing That a Miracle Has Occurredf we also had good reason to believe it “… was a non-repeatable as opposed to a repeatable counter-instance to a formula L which we have on all other evidence good reason to believe to be a law of nature” (p. 20).

institute

Conclusion: Miracles and Contemporary Epistemologystion but one that can be limited at the outset. It can be limited partly arbitrarily, but also because much of the contemporary debate in epistemology is, I think, neutral with regard to the type of evaluative and normative question about the possibility of justified belief in miracles that we have been examining.

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巡回

Hume’s Account of , Reasoningks that all reasoning about matters of fact, any . reasoning, is a species of reasoning founded on the relation of cause and effect. Our judgments concerning the reliability of testimony, whether to ordinary or extraordinary events, should therefore be consonant with the principles of reasoning from

蚊帳

Miracles and Reasoning Based on Experiencef such testimony and not just a “probable” argument. We should, therefore, expect an argument to the effect that past experience, when properly considered (i.e. considered in accordance with the above principles), completely supports a judgment against the credibility of such testimony. In accordanc

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Individual

Miracles and the Logical Entailment Analysis of Causations so despite Hume’s explicit acknowledgement that they are possible. . any knowledge (i.e. justified true belief) of miracles is likewise impossible. I have shown this latter impossibility to be intrinsically connected to the former.

庇護

Are Miracles Violations of Laws of Nature?[., p. 114]. Yet if my explanation of Hume’s argument thus far has been correct this premise actually plays no significant role in the argument. The premise is really a gloss for the underlying supposition that one cannot have an “impression” of a supernatural event. Because no such impression can b

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