Titlebook: Games and Dynamics in Economics; Essays in Honor of A Ferenc Szidarovszky,Gian Italo Bischi Book 2020 Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 20

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Mixed Duopolies with Advance Productionium of the timing game lies at simultaneous moves. An analysis of the public firm’s impact on social surplus is also carried out. All the results are compared with those of the production-to order version of the respective game and with those of the mixed duopoly timing games.

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GRAIN

Path Dependence in Models with Fading Memory or Adaptive Learning attracting sets may occur. In other words, even if the two different kinds of learning dynamics have the same attracting sets, they may have different basins of attraction. This implies that local stability results are not sufficient to select the kind of long-run dynamics since this may crucially

一小塊

Eductive Stability, Heterogeneous Information Costs and Period-Two Cycle Multiplicitycles emerge. While in Hommes and Wagener (.) such phenomenon occurs only when the steady state is locally stable, we observe the coexistence of multiple locally stable period-two cycles also when the equilibrium is unstable, thanks to information costs. Moreover, we show that the relative position o

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N?ther’s Theorem and the Lie Symmetries in the Goodwin-Modelral of the model’s Lagrangian is stationary, which by the principle of least action also means that they satisfy the first-order necessary conditions. The optimality still needs to satisfy the sufficient condition. Since the Legendre’s second-order sufficient condition is not applicable here, we sho

被告

Agent Behavior and Transitions in ,-Person Social Dilemma Gamesment using parameters that extend over all of these games. It is found that there are three significantly different types of agent behavior: bipartisan, partisan, and unison. Bipartisan agents stochastically decide to cooperate or defect based on a cooperating probability greater than zero and less

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眼界

Mally Shechory Bitton,Donya Hawa-Kamel attracting sets may occur. In other words, even if the two different kinds of learning dynamics have the same attracting sets, they may have different basins of attraction. This implies that local stability results are not sufficient to select the kind of long-run dynamics since this may crucially

chiropractor

https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230371286cles emerge. While in Hommes and Wagener (.) such phenomenon occurs only when the steady state is locally stable, we observe the coexistence of multiple locally stable period-two cycles also when the equilibrium is unstable, thanks to information costs. Moreover, we show that the relative position o

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Religious Meaning and Experienceral of the model’s Lagrangian is stationary, which by the principle of least action also means that they satisfy the first-order necessary conditions. The optimality still needs to satisfy the sufficient condition. Since the Legendre’s second-order sufficient condition is not applicable here, we sho