Titlebook: Game Theory and Fisheries Management; Theory and Applicati Lone Gr?nb?k,Marko Lindroos,Pedro Pintassilgo Book 2020 Springer Nature Switzerl

engender

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-13840-2urces, fishery economists analysing such management had no choice but to bring game theory to bear. The steadily increasing complexity of international fishery management brought forth the need for game theory models of greater and greater sophistication. The application of game theory to the econom

Ccu106

anticipate

he real world of fisheries management policy. As such, it is designed to appeal to policy makers and stakeholders, as well as to graduate students in Economics..?..?.978-3-030-40114-6978-3-030-40112-2

Kinetic

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-40112-2Stability of Fisheries Agreements; Sustainability of Fisheries Management; Cooperative Games; Non-coope

先鋒派

預(yù)兆好

Conclusions,, arising from the previous seven chapters. The second is to point to major gaps in the literature, pertaining to game theory and fisheries management, and thus to look forward to the future challenges in the application of game theory to fisheries management.

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Lone Gr?nb?k,Marko Lindroos,Pedro PintassilgoTargets a broad audience from graduate students to policy makers and stakeholders.First textbook suitable for teaching game theory in fishery economics in graduate programmes.Combines theory and pract

傲慢物

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-663-13840-2ually over time. If the commencement of modern fisheries economics can be seen to be marked by the publication of H. Scott Gordon’s seminal 1954 article, it can be said that, for the first quarter-century of modern fisheries economics, game theory played a negligible role. There was no perceptible s

explicit

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