Titlebook: Game Theoretical Foundations of Evolutionary Stability; Immanuel M. Bomze,Benedikt M. P?tscher Book 1989 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg

ABS

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致命

為敵

palpitate

motivate

Mixed strategies, ., . ∈ .. Here .: .→?. maps a distribution . to the vector .(.) of mean payoffs to the pure strategies against members of a population in state .. Using these relations, we have .∈ε.if and only if for all . ∈ ., . ≠ ., . holds whenever 0<ε<ε(.). Similarly, .∈ξ. if and only if

Condyle

Condyle

Replicator dynamics,, uninvadability implies dynamical stability (defined below), whereas evolutionary stability neither implies nor is implied by the dynamical stability concept; see, e.g. [. 1987, p.226, Fig.9.4.4b], and Example 18 below.

Employee

Repatriate

Introduction,racting individuals and to explain why certain states of a given population are — in course of the selection process — stable against perturbations induced by mutations. In particular, an explanation is sought how stable polymorphisms of behaviour can arise in a population, as is observed, e.g., in certain mammal societies.

Misnomer