Titlebook: Game Equilibrium Models III; Strategic Bargaining Reinhard Selten Book 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991 Evolution.Spieltheorie.W

Minutes

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07367-4Evolution; Spieltheorie; Wirtschaftstheorie; economics; equilibrium; evolutionary processes; evolution?re

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Algebraic Methods in Operator TheoryIn the tradition of folk theorems, this paper shows that nearly anything can be a bargaining outcome of the proposal-making model.

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Cuisine

,Introduction to the Series “Game Equilibrium Models”,Game equilibrium models are descriptions of interactive decision situations by games in extensive or normal form. The analysis of such models is based on the equilibrium point concept, often refined by additional requirements like subgame perfectness. The series consists of four volumes:

Macronutrients

Folk Theorems for the Proposal-Making Model,In the tradition of folk theorems, this paper shows that nearly anything can be a bargaining outcome of the proposal-making model.

instulate

Wage Bargaining as a Strategic Game,Wage bargaining between “capital” and “l(fā)abor” is analyzed as an alternating offer game, where disagreement leads to surplus sharing according to the contractual status quo or to a strike.

incisive

Mathematics and Its Applications a bargaining theory model. Despite the differences in the approach of these three models and the resulting differences in the nature of their solutions, all three models make similar predictions of bargaining outcomes.

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-322-80278-1ision environment. This paper analyzes data from a computer-aided laboratory study of decision making in spatially represented, majority rule games to identify influences of prominent features of the problem environment on the processes and outcomes of decision, and the way in which these influences change through competition and learning.*

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Three Approaches to Bargaining in NTU Games, a bargaining theory model. Despite the differences in the approach of these three models and the resulting differences in the nature of their solutions, all three models make similar predictions of bargaining outcomes.