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Titlebook: Game Equilibrium Models II; Methods, Morals, and Reinhard Selten Book 1991 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1991 Evolution.Spieltheorie.Wi

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21#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 04:06:03 | 只看該作者
A. Brini,F. Regonati,A. G. B. Teoliselements in the analysis are the study of primitive equilibria and of the tracing procedure. The analysis sheds light on the “evolutive” and the “eductive” aspects of Harsanyi and Selten’s theory and it also allows a better understanding of the older, non game theoretic literature on signaling.
22#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 11:02:24 | 只看該作者
Equilibrium Selection in the Spence Signaling Game,elements in the analysis are the study of primitive equilibria and of the tracing procedure. The analysis sheds light on the “evolutive” and the “eductive” aspects of Harsanyi and Selten’s theory and it also allows a better understanding of the older, non game theoretic literature on signaling.
23#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 15:15:27 | 只看該作者
On Supergames and Folk Theorems: A Conceptual Discussion,is repeated an infinite number of times, the threat of retaliation becomes an enforcement mechanism which assures the cooperative behavior of the agents. This is, in a very crude and simple fashion, the message of the Folk Theorem.
24#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 18:01:10 | 只看該作者
25#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-25 20:16:31 | 只看該作者
Abdallah Assi,Margherita Barilequilibria leaves only stationary equilibria in supergames. . ask when subgame-perfection may not pay appropriate attention to whether the group wishes to deviate from plans made, that is, to renegotiate.
26#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 02:05:00 | 只看該作者
27#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 05:24:13 | 只看該作者
Connectedness, Smooth and Simplerstad [19881) than in the more artificial setting of private-values auctions (where each bidder knows for sure the asset’s value to him, cf. Kagel, Harstad and Levin [1987], Cox, Roberson and Smith [1982]).
28#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 09:28:36 | 只看該作者
A Framing Effect Observed in a Market Game,rstad [19881) than in the more artificial setting of private-values auctions (where each bidder knows for sure the asset’s value to him, cf. Kagel, Harstad and Levin [1987], Cox, Roberson and Smith [1982]).
29#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 16:27:01 | 只看該作者
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07365-0Evolution; Spieltheorie; Wirtschaftstheorie; algebra; economics; equilibrium; evolutionary processes; evolu
30#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 19:37:14 | 只看該作者
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