Titlebook: Expectations and Stability in Oligopoly Models; Koji Okuguchi Book 1976 Springer-Verlag Berlin · Heidelberg 1976 Stability.calculus.functi

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-99915-4Though the stability condition for the Cournot oligopoly solution in a discrete (difference equation) system in the previous chapter ensured uniqueness of the solution, we assumed its uniqueness in our analysis of global stability in continuous (differential equation) systems.

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-68196-1The Cournot assumption on rivals’ behavior in oligopoly is undoubtedly naive. Two more general formulae for formation of expectations exist in economic theory. One is extrapolative and the other adaptive. Under the former, the expected value of an economic variable x in period t, x., is given by . or

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Uniqueness of the Cournot Oligopoly Solution,Though the stability condition for the Cournot oligopoly solution in a discrete (difference equation) system in the previous chapter ensured uniqueness of the solution, we assumed its uniqueness in our analysis of global stability in continuous (differential equation) systems.

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Extrapolative Expectations and Stability of Oligopoly Equilibrium,The Cournot assumption on rivals’ behavior in oligopoly is undoubtedly naive. Two more general formulae for formation of expectations exist in economic theory. One is extrapolative and the other adaptive. Under the former, the expected value of an economic variable x in period t, x., is given by . or

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59558-0due to Mayberry, Nash and Shubik(1953)(see also Shubik (1959)), let two firms’ cost functions in a Cournot duopoly under no product differentiation be given by . and let . be the market demand function. If two firms act in perfect competition, marginal costs of both must equal the competitively given market price.

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