Titlebook: Essentials of Game Theory; A Concise Multidisci Kevin Leyton-Brown,Yoav Shoham Book 2008 Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2008

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Coping with Accession to the European Unionubsets of the outcomes ofa game. While the most important solution concept is the Nash equilibrium, there are also a large number of others, only some of which we will discuss here. Some of these concepts are more restrictive than the Nash equilibrium, some less so, and some noncomparable. In subseq

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Patricia L. Brantingham,Paul J. Brantinghamconceptually straightforward, and most game theorists see it as fundamental. While many other representations exist to describe finite games, we will see in this chapter and in those that follow that each of them has an “induced normal form”: a corresponding normal-form representation that preserves

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Coping with Chronic Illness and Disabilityo known as .. As was mentioned at the beginning of Chapter 1, when we introduced noncooperative game theory, the term “cooperative” can be misleading. It does not mean that each agent is agreeable and will follow arbitrary instructions. Rather, it means that the basic modeling unit is the group rath

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1939-4608 tically in recent years, and now spans disciplines as diverse as political science, biology, psychology, economics, linguistics, sociology, and computer science, among others. What has been missing is a relatively short introduction to the field covering the common basis that anyone with a professio

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Further Solution Concepts for Normal-Form Games, of which we will discuss here. Some of these concepts are more restrictive than the Nash equilibrium, some less so, and some noncomparable. In subsequent chapters we will introduce some additional solution concepts that are only applicable to game representations other than the normal form.

Coronation

Patricia L. Brantingham,Paul J. Brantingham game-theoretic properties such as Nash equilibria. Thus the results given in previous chapters hold for all finite games, no matter how they are represented; in that sense the normal-form representation is universal.