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Titlebook: Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision; Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer Book 2011 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nat

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發(fā)表于 2025-3-21 16:42:47 | 只看該作者 |倒序?yàn)g覽 |閱讀模式
書(shū)目名稱(chēng)Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision
編輯Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer
視頻videohttp://file.papertrans.cn/316/315301/315301.mp4
概述Gives an insight into contract design and incentive provision.Three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems.The book is aimed at scholars and students of busine
叢書(shū)名稱(chēng)Edition KWV
圖書(shū)封面Titlebook: Essays on Contract Design and Incentive Provision; Eva I. Hoppe-Fischer Book 2011 Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nat
描述Contract theory, which emphasizes the importance of unverifiable actions and private information, has been a highly active field of research in microeconomics in the last decades. This thesis is divided into two parts. Part I consists of three chapters that study contract-theoretic models which are motivated by the classic procurement problem of a principal who wants an agent to deliver a certain good or service. In such models it is typically assumed that decision makers are interested in their own monetary payoffs only. Moreover, they have unlimited cognitive abilities and behave in a perfectly rational way. Yet, in practice people often do not behave this way. While empirical research is very difficult in contract theory, laboratory experiments have recently turned out to be an important source of data. In Part II, three experimental studies are presented that investigate contract-theoretic problems brought up in Part I..
出版日期Book 2011
關(guān)鍵詞contract design; incentive provisions; public-private partnerships; behavioral biases; public ownership;
版次1
doihttps://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-24133-9
isbn_softcover978-3-658-24132-2
isbn_ebook978-3-658-24133-9Series ISSN 2946-0301 Series E-ISSN 2946-031X
issn_series 2946-0301
copyrightSpringer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2011
The information of publication is updating

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Public-Private Partnerships versus Traditional Procurement: Innovation Incentives and Information Gaased services in various sectors such as health care, education, and transportation. As has been pointed out by Hart (2003), a key property of a public-private partnership is the fact that facility construction and subsequent service provision are bundled and assigned to a single private-sector enti
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The Costs and Benefits of Additional Information in Agency Models with Endogenous Information Struction structure is exogenously given, more recently a relatively small literature has emerged in which the agent is not privately informed from the outset, but has the ability to acquire private information; i.e., the information structure is endogenous.
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Can Contracts Solve the Hold-Up Problem? Experimental Evidenceufficient incentives to make non-contractible investments if it fears that it will be held up by its partner in the future. This hold-up problem is an important ingredient of the incomplete contracting approach, which has become a leading paradigm in institutional and organizational economics.
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Conflicting Tasks and Moral Hazard: Theory and Experimental Evidencetions in which two different tasks to be delegated may be in direct conflict with each other; i.e., providing effort in one task may have a negative side effect on the success probability of the other task. In such situations, job design becomes a major issue.
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Arkendu Sen,Lakshmi Selvaratnamthe design of selling and procurement mechanisms, the provision of investment incentives in trading relationships, the design of wage schemes, and the assignment of different tasks within firms, have all been fruitfully studied from a contract-theoretic perspective.
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