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Titlebook: Equilibrium Theory for Cournot Oligopolies and Related Games; Essays in Honour of Pierre von Mouche,Federico Quartieri Book 2016 Springer

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樓主: Considerate
31#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-26 21:02:49 | 只看該作者
Pure Strategy Equilibria in Finite Symmetric Concave Games and an Application to Symmetric Discreteng other things, that if the industry revenue function is concave, the inverse demand function is nonincreasing, and the cost function is convex, then the payoff function of the firm satisfies the conditions and this symmetric game has a pure strategy equilibrium.
32#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 01:22:54 | 只看該作者
33#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 07:56:24 | 只看該作者
Two-Group Contests with Communication Within and Between Groups,e two groups. We show how a fictitious game with “most inefficient fictitious contenders” can be constructed to prove the existence of a unique group-proof Nash equilibrium of the original two-group contest game. An example evidences that cautious arguments on the (twice) differentiability of cost functions must be used in such a construction.
34#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 11:17:29 | 只看該作者
35#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 16:16:14 | 只看該作者
36#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 19:31:57 | 只看該作者
Graeme Hammer,Peter Carberry,Roger Stoneality by adopting the discriminatory subsidy and, as a result, can achieve social welfare maximization. Our result suggests that even when there exists firm asymmetry between public and private firms, it is not important for privatization authorities to determine whether to privatize the public firm
37#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-27 22:10:50 | 只看該作者
Sundarapandian Vaidyanathan,Chang-Hua Liensome variables evolve in continuous time whereas other ones change in (event-driven) discrete time. Fishery models where the aquatic environment is subdivided into adjacent patches, characterized by different fishing policies including, as a particular case, Marine Protected Areas, are also describe
38#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 04:04:46 | 只看該作者
39#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 07:26:16 | 只看該作者
Privatization Neutrality Theorem and Discriminatory Subsidy Policy,ality by adopting the discriminatory subsidy and, as a result, can achieve social welfare maximization. Our result suggests that even when there exists firm asymmetry between public and private firms, it is not important for privatization authorities to determine whether to privatize the public firm
40#
發(fā)表于 2025-3-28 13:22:03 | 只看該作者
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