Titlebook: Entrepreneurship, Governance and Ethics; Robert Cressy,Douglas Cumming,Christine Mallin Book 2012 Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 201

男生戴手銬

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Deal Structuring in Philanthropic Venture Capital Investments: Financing Instrument, Valuation and rather than as a principal. Conversely, while backing non-profit social ventures, philanthropic venture capitalists structure their deal similarly as traditional venture capital, as the absence of the non-distribution constraint makes such investments subject to moral hazard risk both in terms of p

發(fā)酵

Legal Protection, Corruption and Private Equity Returns in Asia,, controlling for legal systems. This finding is consistent with the view that private equity managers bring about organizational change to alleviate the costs of corruption. Our findings are robust to inclusion of controls for Hofstede cultural variables, economic conditions, and transaction specif

jungle

拘留

,The UK Alternative Investment Market – Ethical Dimensions,ermine why these scandals occurred – were they, for example, attributable to corporate governance weaknesses? Finally, we offer some concluding comments to discuss the future of AIM. The findings of the article have important implications for investors and policymakers alike.

寬容

,Corporate Fraud and Managers’ Behavior: Evidence from the Press,perceived behavioral control and moral obligation. Therefore, it is potentially important that the professional standards that are related to fraud detection strengthen the emphasis on managers’ behavior that may be associated with unethical behavior.

Pillory

泥瓦匠

corruption and facilitating integrity in management,entrepreneurship and finance. Previously published in the Journal of Business Ethics, Volume 95 Supplement 2, 2010?978-94-017-7937-1978-94-007-2926-1

Palliation

Markus Niederh?user,Nicole Rosenberger rather than as a principal. Conversely, while backing non-profit social ventures, philanthropic venture capitalists structure their deal similarly as traditional venture capital, as the absence of the non-distribution constraint makes such investments subject to moral hazard risk both in terms of p

Gentry