Titlebook: Effectivity Functions in Social Choice; J. Abdou,H. Keiding Book 1991 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1991 Nash equilibrium.coop

canonical

數(shù)量

epidermis

刻苦讀書

978-94-010-5525-3Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 1991

無畏

gruelling

小步走路

Ethics

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-50859-2 this, we had to find a game form such that at each profile, the set of strong Nash equilibria of the resulting game coincided with the values of the social choice correspondence at this profile. The particular game form solving this problem was usually of minor interest; its main role was to establ

Inculcate

,Das station?re elektrische Str?mungsfeld,One might get the impression that this is the only interesting cooperative solution. This is wrong, however. For all its merits, the strong Nash equilibrium cannot be considered as the only way of formulating a cooperative solution.

令人作嘔

,Das station?re elektrische Feld,ivity functions associated with a social choice correspondence or with a game form (together with a comment on a further one, the so-called first efFectivity function .* associated with a social choice function). One can easily get the impression that the α- and β-construction are the only ones of i