Titlebook: Decision and Game Theory for Security; 14th International C Jie Fu,Tomas Kroupa,Yezekael Hayel Conference proceedings 2023 The Editor(s) (i

滑動(dòng)

Deeksha Kaul,Harika Raju,B. K. Tripathy assets. Careful strategic placement of honeypots in networks should consider not only network aspects but also attackers’ preferences. The allocation of honeypots in tactical networks under network mobility is of great interest. To achieve this objective, we present a game-theoretic approach that g

Affectation

Deeksha Kaul,Harika Raju,B. K. Tripathystem using a formal security model: a probabilistic attack graph. By allocating fake targets/decoys, the defender aims to distract the attacker from compromising true targets. By increasing the cost of some attack actions, the defender aims to discourage the attacker from committing to certain polic

Fortuitous

Vasodilation

身心疲憊

樂(lè)意

chisel

978-3-031-50669-7The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerl

Macronutrients

Decision and Game Theory for Security978-3-031-50670-3Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349

Enthralling

Observable Perfect Equilibriumle action probabilities (not necessarily over all action probabilities that may not be observable by opposing players). Observable perfect equilibrium correctly captures the assumption that the opponent is playing as rationally as possible given mistakes that have been observed (while previous solut

六個(gè)才偏離

Does Cyber-Insurance Benefit the?Insured or?the?Attacker? – A Game of?Cyber-Insurancevestment and increases the attacker’s expected payoffs. Therefore, the attacker has a motive to manipulate cyber-insurance by selective cyber-attacks on organizations up to a critical point, beyond which we discovered that imposing further threat will force organizations to invest more in cybersecur