| 期刊全稱 | Bilateral Bargaining | | 期刊簡稱 | Theory and Applicati | | 影響因子2023 | Stefan Napel | | 視頻video | http://file.papertrans.cn/186/185873/185873.mp4 | | 學科分類 | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems | | 圖書封面 |  | | 影響因子 | This book investigates bargaining between two agents. Its objective is to present, to extend, and to apply the present state of theoretical knowledge. A wide range of questions will be considered: First of all, will two parties reach efficient agreements? Traditional economic theory gives a generally affirma- tive answer for perfectly rational agents, who can carry out complex calcu- lations instantaneously and without cost. The book uses innovative methods to analyse the implications of less demanding assumptions. A practical ques- tion related to bargaining is: How much power does the design of institutions such as the U. N. Security Council give to each of its members? Formally, non- permanent members‘ votes are necessary to pass resolutions, but theoretical investigation of pre-voting negotiation attributes all power to the five perma- nent members. Or one may ask whether a society should rather finance the education in higher mathematics for a talented person than remedial training for a retarded person? Different concepts of justice yield different answers. Which particular concept is implemented in a given society is also a matter of bargaining, and it is of special philosop | | Pindex | Book 2002 |
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