Titlebook: Axiomatic Models of Bargaining; Alvin E. Roth Book 1979 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 1979 bargaining.cooperative games.evaluation.uti

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Risk Posturecular bargains which might yield those utilities. This permitted us to summarize in a concise way each player’s preferences over all possible bargains, including those which might involve chance events (i.e., lotteries), without explicitly considering those lotteries.

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A Critical Evaluation of the Independence Propertiesernatives can be uniquely determined by specifying the outcome which it selects in the ‘canonical’ game (ā,ō). Each of the two independence properties represents an assumption concerning the way in which different bargaining games are related to one another, and together they essentially imply that

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Interpersonal Comparisonsformation contained in their expected utility functions. Such solutions are independent of a wider range of transformations than are solutions which depend on the cardinal properties of the players’ utilities. But whether we have been considering ordinal or cardinal solutions, we have thus far been

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“Irrelevant” Alternativestives but which, unlike the Nash solutions, are not independent of equivalent utility representations. In this section we will consider some solutions which are independent of equivalent utility representations, but which are not independent of “irrelevant” alternatives. That is, we will consider so

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