Titlebook: Automated Reasoning for Security Protocol Analysis and Issues in the Theory of Security; Joint Workshop, ARSP Alessandro Armando,Gavin Lowe

ASSET

Basic Income: Real Freedom for All?elations between the three security domains and a lower abstraction level language able to represent the model and describe attacks which span the three security domains..Using the Portunes framework, we are able to represent a whole new family of attacks where the insider is not assumed to use purely digital actions to achieve a malicious goal.

沙文主義

WITH

Modular Plans for Secure Service Composition,information on the behaviours of their components. From a history expression, we then extract a plan that drives executions that never rise security violations..Finally, we show how partial plans satisfying security requirements can be put together to obtain a safe orchestration plan.

任命

Formal Analysis of Key Integrity in PKCS#11,keys, while performing sensitive operations. We further enrich the model with a . mechanism ensuring that only controlled, non-tampered keys are used in cryptographic operations, and we show how this modified API prevents the above mentioned key-replacement attacks.

harrow

軍火

The CaPiTo Approach to Protocol Validation, without being overwhelmed by the underlying implementation details and, on the other hand, we can obtain a concrete specification respecting the industrial standards used for ensuring security. We consider this development important in order to get a good agreement between the protocols analysed by

注視

Reasoning about Probabilistic Security Using Task-PIOAs,vide a formal framework for the universal composability paradigms of protocol security. One of their advantages is that that they allow one to distinguish high-level nondeterminism that can affect the outcome of the protocol, from low-level choices, which can’t. We present an alternative approach to

易彎曲

高調(diào)

Modular Plans for Secure Service Composition,ts and they often result from the composition of many services..We address here the problem of statically guaranteeing security of open services, i.e.?services with unknown components. Security constraints are expressed by local policies that service components must obey..We present here a type and

Serenity