Titlebook: Arrow and the Foundations of the Theory of Economic Policy; George R. Feiwel (Alumni Distinguished Service Pro Book 1987 George R. Feiwel

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Peak Pricing, Congestion, and Fairnessthe fact that the associated congestion causes disutility, through delays, crowding, etc. Second, we investigate formally the . of the peak-pricing solution,. comparing it with uniformity of pricing in all periods — an issue that has disturbed observers outside our profession, but that economists ha

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4899-6523-3 by his personality (his mind, spirit, humanity, conscience, and enthusiasm), this chapter hardly needs justification. Great scholars are not always admirable individuals. This is not true of Arrow. To the extent that I succeeded (as always, with the exemplary and devoted assistance of my ‘permanent

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-38179-4 part of his work to date that most strikes a moral philosopher is his critique of utilitarianism. The critique brought to moral theory the full force of the ‘ordinalist revolution’ in economics. Classical utilitarians assessed policies by their contribution to the general happiness — to the sum of

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-38179-4e on maximizing subsequent freedom of choice rather than current expected utility. It may be argued against this view that a sufficiently rich decision framework will take account of the utility of such second-order effects as future freedom of decision, properly discounted, of course. But I am deep

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-38179-4ial actions’ (Arrow 1967, p. 12). Numerous problems, different from each other in many important respects, fit into this general characterization. The voluminous literature on the preference aggregation problems has extensively utilized the uniform and abstract framework of the axiomatic social choi

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https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-38179-4m (Arrow and Debreu 1954) and the decentrali-zability of a Pareto optimum (Arrow 1951). In this chapter, we are concerned with general equilibrium in a setting where some goods are indivisible. Hence, several hypotheses that are standard in equilibrium analysis are not satisfied. None the less, as w