Titlebook: Algorithmic Game Theory; Third International Spyros Kontogiannis,Elias Koutsoupias,Paul G. Spir Conference proceedings 2010 Springer-Verla

aviator

MUT

遣返回國(guó)

The Computational Complexity of Trembling Hand Perfection and Other Equilibrium Refinements, equilibrium of a given three-player game in strategic form with integer payoffs is trembling hand perfect. Analogous results are shown for a number of other solution concepts, including proper equilibrium, (the strategy part of) sequential equilibrium, quasi-perfect equilibrium and CURB..The proofs

Talkative

Complexity of Safe Strategic Voting, model, a potential manipulator . announces how he intends to vote, and some of the other voters whose preferences coincide with those of . may follow suit. Depending on the number of followers, the outcome could be better or worse for . than the outcome of truthful voting. A manipulative vote is ca

創(chuàng)作

Ptosis

When the Players Are Not Expectation Maximizers,Much of Game Theory, including the Nash equilibrium concept, is based on the assumption that players are expectation maximizers. It is known that if players are risk averse, games may no longer have Nash equilibria [11,6]. We show that

無(wú)表情

使人煩燥

Algorithmic Game Theory978-3-642-16170-4Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349

Texture

0302-9743 Overview: 978-3-642-16169-8978-3-642-16170-4Series ISSN 0302-9743 Series E-ISSN 1611-3349

ear-canal

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-16170-4Braess‘s paradox; Hedonic games; Nash equilibrium; algorithmic game theory; auctions; coalition formation