Titlebook: Advances in Economic Design; Murat R. Sertel,Semih Koray Book 2003 Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2003 Bargaining.Economic Design.Elect

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Rachel A. Gordon,Herbert J. Walbergs’ decision process is determined by a market price system ., where .. Namely, a seller . solves the task max .. where .(.) is the cost incurred by seller . when he contracts with a set . of buyers. A buyer ., similarly, will solve for max . [.(.) - .(.)], where .(.) is the utility of buyer . after

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Introduction: Whither the Iron Rice-Bowl?hanism theory. The non-cooperative foundation of the Nash bargaining solution is used as an example to shed light on the formal relation between traditional non-cooperative support of cooperative solutions and mechanism theoretic implementation of social choice rules. The technical possibility of re

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Pay and Motivation in Chinese Enterprisesoblem in a convex compact set, given a status-quo point, agents’ preferences and their bargaining powers. A competitive allocation is a point whose image in the supporting linear utilities is just the Nash bargaining solution. Next, we give axiomatic characterizations. At the end a simple price-allo

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Pay and Motivation in Chinese Enterprisesbility frontier and an arbitrary threat point. At the pre-donation stage “Lucky Bargainer”, i.e., the bargainer with the higher ideal payoff, donates a portion of her would-be payoff to her opponent before they bargain. Results show that, under both solutions, there is always an incentive for pre-do

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Satellite Farming, Food, and Human Wellbeingup of firms can induce a dismantling deviation such that each member is in a smaller cartel in the resulting structure. It is required that a deviation only occurs if it is robust against further dismantling deviation. I characterize the set of stable cartel structures called the Just Profitable Car

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