Titlebook: Web and Internet Economics; 12th International C Yang Cai,Adrian Vetta Conference proceedings 2016 Springer-Verlag GmbH Germany 2016 algori

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Pricing to Maximize Revenue and Welfare Simultaneously in Large Markets,settings, prices that maximize (approximately) profit also result in high social welfare. Our results holds for general multi-minded buyers in large markets with production costs; we also provide improved guarantees for the important special case of unit-demand buyers.

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Anonymous Auctions Maximizing Revenue, . for regular distributions) and that even posted price mechanisms match those guarantees. Understanding that the real power of anonymous mechanisms comes when the auctioneer can infer the bidder identities accurately, we show a tight . approximation guarantee when each bidder can be confused with

Buttress

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Conference Program Design with Single-Peaked and Single-Crossing Preferences,n the negative side, we show that a generalization of CPD, where some items must be assigned to specific sets in the solution, is .-hard for dichotomous single-peaked preferences. For single-crossing preferences, we present a dynamic programming exact algorithm that runs in polynomial time if . is c

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certain

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Putting Peer Prediction Under the Micro(economic)scope and Making Truth-Telling Focal,ssify all equilibria of the peer-prediction mechanism; (2) introduce a new technical tool for understanding scoring rules, which allows us to make truth-telling pay better than any other informative equilibrium; (3) leverage this tool to provide an optimal version of the previous result; that is, we

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