標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Vascular Mechanics and Pathology; Mano J. Thubrikar Textbook 2007 Springer-Verlag US 2007 biomedical engineering.cardiovascular.endotheliu [打印本頁] 作者: Monsoon 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 17:59
書目名稱Vascular Mechanics and Pathology影響因子(影響力)
書目名稱Vascular Mechanics and Pathology影響因子(影響力)學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Vascular Mechanics and Pathology網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度
書目名稱Vascular Mechanics and Pathology網(wǎng)絡(luò)公開度學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Vascular Mechanics and Pathology被引頻次
書目名稱Vascular Mechanics and Pathology被引頻次學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Vascular Mechanics and Pathology年度引用
書目名稱Vascular Mechanics and Pathology年度引用學(xué)科排名
書目名稱Vascular Mechanics and Pathology讀者反饋
書目名稱Vascular Mechanics and Pathology讀者反饋學(xué)科排名
作者: Cpap155 時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 21:37 作者: 粗語 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 01:10
ediate reward functions, representing either individual payoffs in a multiagent problem or rewards with respect to different objectives. In this context, we focus on the determination of a policy that fairly shares regrets among agents or objectives, the regret being defined on each dimension as the作者: 小淡水魚 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 05:11 作者: expunge 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 10:36
gotiation. Since a negotiating team is composed of several stakeholders, represented as a single negotiating party, there is need for a voting rule for the team to reach decisions. In this paper, we investigate the problem of strategic voting in the context of negotiating teams. Specifically, we pre作者: 雄辯 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 16:28
which no player envies the bundle of items allocated to the other players too much. We present a simple proof that deterministic truthful allocations do not minimize envy by characterizing the truthful mechanisms for two players and two items. Also, we present an analysis for uniformly random alloca作者: HACK 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 17:04
arbitrary, valuations for outcomes are convex functions in the type, and utilities over outcomes and payments are quasi-linear. Archer and Kleinberg?[1] have proven that in case of valuation functions that are linear in the type monotonicity in combination with a local integrability condition are eq作者: 欲望 時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 22:45
agents of different types each strategically select a node on a given graph that models the residential area to maximize their individual utility. The latter solely depends on the types of the agents on neighboring nodes and it has been a standard assumption to consider utility functions that are mo作者: LATER 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 03:19
ell as a maximum cost per click, and may not be assigned to more than one slot for a particular search. We give a truthful mechanism under the utility model where bidders try to maximize their clicks, subject to their personal constraints. In addition, we show that the revenue-maximizing mechanism i作者: Carcinogenesis 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 07:33 作者: Perineum 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 10:57 作者: 有幫助 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 16:08
l by encoding other-regarding preferences of the players into the utility functions. By doing so we leave the original domain where VCG mechanisms can be applied directly..We derive a characterization of the class of truthful mechanisms under the new model, crucially exploiting the specific form of 作者: 顯示 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 19:30 作者: 雪崩 時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 23:00 作者: oxidant 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 06:18
strategy that is given by the empirical frequencies of actions played in previous rounds. There is a close relationship between fictitious play and the Nash equilibria of a game: if the empirical frequencies of fictitious play converge to a strategy profile, this strategy profile is a Nash equilibr作者: 橢圓 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 09:36 作者: Camouflage 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 11:53
ier completion times. In our model, completing a job provides a benefit equal to its present value, i.e., the value discounted to the time when the job finishes. Users submit job requirements to the cloud provider who non-preemptively schedules jobs to maximize the social welfare, i.e., the sum of p作者: 一加就噴出 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 17:46
number of goods, when the preferences are identical and budgets are generic, a 2 approximation of competitive equilibrium (2-.) always exists. By 2-. we mean that every buyer receives a bundle with a value at least half of the value of her most desirable bundle that fits within her budget, and the 作者: 態(tài)學(xué) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 20:25 作者: 昏迷狀態(tài) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 02:56
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-0-387-68234-1biomedical engineering; cardiovascular; endothelium; medical devices; smooth muscle作者: wangle 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 05:40
978-1-4899-8924-6Springer-Verlag US 2007作者: 表狀態(tài) 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 09:34
The first class is based on additive capacities or weights, and the second on the influence in a social network. While neither class holds the gross substitutes condition, we show that in both classes the existence of WEQ is guaranteed under certain restrictions, and in particular when there are only two competing buyers.作者: A保存的 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 12:25
Mano J. ThubrikarIncludes supplementary material: 作者: Soliloquy 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 19:07
Textbook 2007es. This obviously poses a significant challenge to the artery and therefore the artery must be endowed with special structure and properties to meet this challenge. In the event that additional challenges are imposed, such as high blood pressure, it would not be surprising that the artery could “br作者: textile 時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 22:26
le, with respect to the degree of the black hole Δ. We provide an algorithm for black hole search without the knowledge of incoming link as well. We prove that this algorithm is correct, and that it uses . agents, thus providing optimal solution.作者: Insubordinate 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 00:50 作者: armistice 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 05:55 作者: 沒花的是打擾 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 08:58
s that can redistribute the payments among the players. Also here, it turns out that altruism has a positive effect in the sense that the payments needed to guarantee truthfulness can be further reduced..Finally, we illustrate our theoretical results by applying them to well-studied mechanism design作者: 青春期 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 15:31 作者: verdict 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 20:33 作者: 后天習(xí)得 時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 21:10 作者: Fibrin 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 01:43
Anastomotic Aneurysms and Anastomotic Intimal Hyperplasia,作者: Condense 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 07:06 作者: lobster 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 13:10 作者: Pander 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 17:26 作者: 巧思 時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 18:36
