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標(biāo)題: Titlebook: Game Theory in Management Accounting; Implementing Incenti David Mueller,Ralf Trost Book 2018 Springer International Publishing AG 2018 Coo [打印本頁]

作者: fumble    時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 16:57
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書目名稱Game Theory in Management Accounting讀者反饋學(xué)科排名





作者: Aesthete    時(shí)間: 2025-3-21 23:43
Reflections on the Practical Applicability of Strategic Game Theory to Managerial Incentivationdifferent kinds on human decision making and behaviour. Thereby, it has found mechanisms to effectively induce specific behaviour, like the Groves mechanism. On the other hand, in management accounting the design of effective incentive systems plays a major role. The aim of these incentives is to in
作者: MARS    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 03:54

作者: Fortify    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 05:40
Transfer Prices for Coordination Under Decentralized Decision Makingy, we highlight the specific properties of transfer pricing systems when an intermediate product is sold internally via the transfer price but concurrently also sold on an external market. We adopt an incomplete contracting framework with asymmetric information at the trading stage. In this stylized
作者: 下船    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 08:52
Managerial Compensation, Investment Decisions, and Truthfully Reportinghfully. In a one-period context ‘knowledge’ usually means the profit ratio. In a multi-period setting ‘knowledge’ is referred to the (multivariate) cash flow stream or the (univariate) net present value. Both situations are analysed in the paper. We start with the basic case ‘one firm, one manager’
作者: 哥哥噴涌而出    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 13:29

作者: 哥哥噴涌而出    時(shí)間: 2025-3-22 18:32

作者: Axon895    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 00:15

作者: biopsy    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 01:41
978-3-319-87119-6Springer International Publishing AG 2018
作者: 無價(jià)值    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 09:36

作者: Aromatic    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 10:56

作者: 細(xì)胞膜    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 15:50
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-6795-7different kinds on human decision making and behaviour. Thereby, it has found mechanisms to effectively induce specific behaviour, like the Groves mechanism. On the other hand, in management accounting the design of effective incentive systems plays a major role. The aim of these incentives is to in
作者: impaction    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 21:07

作者: 消息靈通    時(shí)間: 2025-3-23 23:29

作者: sclera    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 05:24

作者: 擁護(hù)    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 09:37

作者: 好忠告人    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 12:53
Setting Incentives for Managers: Incentive Compatibility, Similarity Rule, and Goal Congruencet clear whether ‘setting the right incentives’ means ‘ensuring incentive compatibility’ or something else. This chapter depicts some important relationships between different definitions in differing economic models dealing with incentives, starting with the game theoretic definitions of incentive compatibility.
作者: 刺激    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 15:46

作者: 碌碌之人    時(shí)間: 2025-3-24 21:59
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4939-6795-7y evaluates the practical applicability of these findings to the design of incentive systems in the area of management accounting. The paper concludes with an overview of aspects that should be addressed in future research.
作者: 新星    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 02:17
Cristina Adams Dr,Rui Murrieta,Walter Nevess. The solution concept to incentive contract design problems is subgame-perfection. I present thoughts about possible problems associated with that concept and about available alternatives with an eye on incentive contract design.
作者: 暫停,間歇    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 04:09

作者: Missile    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 08:32
Optimal Design of Incentive Contracts: Behavioural and Multi-Period Performance Measurement Aspectss. The solution concept to incentive contract design problems is subgame-perfection. I present thoughts about possible problems associated with that concept and about available alternatives with an eye on incentive contract design.
作者: 無畏    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 14:07
Entwicklung einer Amazon-Strategie model, transfer pricing guides intra-company trade and provides incentives for value-enhancing specific investments. Dependent on the distribution of information within the firm, we illustrate how these transfer pricing schemes are able to achieve coordination.
作者: 洞穴    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 17:46
Soil Fertility and Production Potentialand continue with the case ‘divisional firm, division managers’. With respect to the first case, we criticise two approaches (Rogerson, JPolE 105(4):770–795, 1997; Reichelstein, RAS 2(2):157–180, 1997) and develop a solution based on extended incentive contracts. To tackle the second case, we analyse pros and cons of Groves schemes.
作者: Comedienne    時(shí)間: 2025-3-25 23:33
Transfer Prices for Coordination Under Decentralized Decision Making model, transfer pricing guides intra-company trade and provides incentives for value-enhancing specific investments. Dependent on the distribution of information within the firm, we illustrate how these transfer pricing schemes are able to achieve coordination.
作者: GLADE    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 03:25

作者: 迅速飛過    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 08:17
1431-1941 operative game theory.Describes the models of auction theoryThis book demonstrates what kind of problems, originating in a management accounting setting, may be solved with game theoretic models. Game theory has experienced growing interest and numerous applications in the field of management accoun
作者: 小畫像    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 09:07
Introduction to the 6th German Editiont clear whether ‘setting the right incentives’ means ‘ensuring incentive compatibility’ or something else. This chapter depicts some important relationships between different definitions in differing economic models dealing with incentives, starting with the game theoretic definitions of incentive compatibility.
作者: 頑固    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 15:00
Developing Families of Method-Oriented Architectureii) management of variability in software methods, which have many commonalties. In order to address these two challenges, we propose the concept of .. This concept is built on top of the principles of service-oriented architectures and software product lines.
作者: deriver    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 17:48
Textbook 2021Latest editionallenge the reader to tackle typical real-life problems in heat transfer. This book will be of potential use for students of mechanical engineering, chemical engineering and metallurgy in most engineering colleges..
作者: 石墨    時(shí)間: 2025-3-26 23:26
Jürgen Neumannese Gesch?fte rentabel sind, wird damit die finanzielle Basis für die ForttUhrung der Gesch?fte aus eigener Kraft gelegt. Zus?tzlich wird die Liquidit?t allerdings auch durch bilanzielle und andere Ma?nahmen beeinflusst. Es ist nicht Intention dieses Buches, eine neue Definition für Cash Flow den be
作者: fallible    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 03:19

作者: 油氈    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 07:11

作者: 千篇一律    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 12:36

作者: cluster    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 15:32
Andrey V. Savchenkohe web for discussions with authors and others who were at the Conference. At IM‘97 the two worlds of computer networks and telecommunications systems came to- gether, each proposing a view to management that stems from their own paradigms. Each world made clear the need for end-to-end management an
作者: 確保    時(shí)間: 2025-3-27 20:39





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